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Violent ‘peace keeping’ is a contradiction in terms but not if we analyse the provision of 
coercive law enforcement as just another organising process in state bureaucracies. This paper 
argues that events surrounding 9/11 merely accelerated processes of coercive peace keeping, 
which were already re-orientating following the end of the Cold-war.  
 
Peace keeping operations involve a range of definitional difficulties since they encompass not 
just peace keeping, but also peace enforcement and pacification.  Peacekeeping can be seen as 
the means by which the international community attempts to achieve conflict prevention, 
management and resolution (Findlay 1997).  It is undertaken through, for example, UN 
operations to implement peace agreements, monitor ceasefires and protect civilians.  Since 1948, 
the number of peacekeepers, usually only armed with light weaponry, has grown considerably - 
with over 250,000 military personnel operating today (Smith, 2003).  Peace enforcement implies 
coercion – including the kind of operations currently being undertaken in Iraq – while 
pacification operations imply a much more violent approach of wiping out dissent at any cost.  
These latter operations, to which this article is concerned, may be regarded as completely 
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illegitimate by the targeted population.  In such a context, as a state loses legitimacy, it also loses 
authority and must deploy increasing levels of force in its enforcement activities, just to maintain 
the status quo. 
 
During pacification operations, activities may go beyond the limits of the law and spawn a 
catalogue of human rights abuses including a crackdown on all forms of dissent, total 
surveillance and tracking of human rights defenders, ‘disappearances’, imprisonment without 
trial and a range of cruel, degrading and inhumane treatments of the civilian population, 
including torture and extra-judicial execution.  The concern for this author is the mechanisms by 
which such approaches evolve into ‘standard operation’ procedures, i.e a form of technology 
which can proliferate to violate human rights elsewhere.  Research by Michael McClintock 
(1992), who tracked training manuals used by US forces in Vietnam, has shown us that 
pacification procedures that advocated assassination, torture, kidnapping, sabotage and the 
overthrow of foreign governments, re-emerged in dirty warfare operations in Laos, Lebanon, 
Nicaragua, the Philippines, Afghanistan, Guatemala, Cuba, Central America and Africa.  Thus, 
‘standard operating’ procedures, while still far from being properly understood, are flexible and 
adaptable.  Without proper legal accountability, such practices lead to state impunity; but, they 
can foster further violent dissent.  As shown below, such conflict dynamics are complex, as any 
popular resistance facing pacification operations can easily generate the deployment of a more 
severe state response - creating a vicious circle of escalating violence and ‘conflict lock in’. 
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This paper uses examples from the Northern Ireland conflict to illustrate the role of sub- lethal 
weapons in peacekeeping activities. The sections below analyse the ethics of using such weapons 
against a civilian population and questions what new systems lie on the horizon.  Such weapons 
provide states with easy technical ‘fixes’ for intractable social and political problems.  After 9/11 
that trend has accelerated with more money being poured into security assistance programmes 
and ‘less-lethal’ weaponry.  But, what can be done to non-violently challenge such developments?  
The paper concludes that future research activists may need completely different information 
models and concepts if they are to help create alternative security paradigms.  
 
Programmes and Paradigms of Pacification  
 
The formulation of critical perspectives on programmes and repressive paradigms of pacification 
is not new. It began during the Vietnam War era, when path-finding researchers like Klare & 
Arnson (1981); Chomsky & Herman (1979); McClintock (1985a, 1985b); and others identified 
new pacification doctrines which were essentially neo-colonial which, they predicted, would 
eventually return to the home-front.  These writers identified a new instrumentalism in 
pacification programmes. Although ostensibly designed to deal with terrorists and illicit drug 
activities, their primary function was to support authoritarian elites who had structural, political 
and commercial ties to old and new imperial powers, especially the United States.  
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Johan Galtung (Galtung, 1964; Galtung & Hoivik 1971) argued that even when there was an 
absence of direct violence, structural barriers to change were a form of violence since they 
systematically blighted the potential growth, sustenance and development of whole social and 
ethnic groups2.  However, Galtung’s key point was that pacification violence was not always 
even defined as violence since it was effectively masked.  Some of the new technologies 
discussed below similarly attempt to mask their coercive role and function and are becoming 
increasingly deployed to deny social and political justice during times of rapid change. 
 
Abram de Swann (1977) was one of the first to recognise that part of the executive in some 
countries is concerned with the professional deterrence of dissent by its citizenry.  De Swann 
(ibid) observed that these government services are bureaucracies providing a service alongside 
other services, with standard operating procedures and opportunities for promotion and service 
enhancement.  What fascinated De Swann were the contradictions between the political 
leadership and the leadership of secret services providing ‘disappearances’, torture and 
professional human rights violations. These processes, according to de Swann (ibid), contained 
paradoxical relations of publicity and secrecy, since the service they provided needed to be both 
predictable and unpredictable since their clientele  (the local population) needed themselves to 
define the line between what is permissible and what activities will lead them into harms way.  
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De Swann (ibid) also noted that the very processes which kept authoritarian regimes in power 
would also damage their international prestige if uncovered.  Tyrannical regimes are acutely 
aware of such factors and Amnesty International files are replete with the names of human rights 
defenders, who have been gobbled up by such processes.  A key factor here is always plausible 
deniability. This option is potentially compromised by the information held by complicit 
functionaries in the apparatus who can sometimes speak out.  There comes a time when people 
calculate their odds of survival in a different way. According to de Swann (ibid), the problem is 
one of ‘synchronicity’ – if enough people choose to resist at the same time, the regime will either 
collapse or it must wage war against its own citizens. 
 
By outlining the process by which declining state authority was correlated with the increasing 
use of force, Marjo Hoefnagels (1977) detailed that when a state lost influence and legitimacy, 
they would be more likely to engage in forceful repression  Thus, when resistance took hold, 
when the  lack of legitimacy reached a certain point, repression often became the key government 
service.  This theory gelled with the notion that new weapons technology used by state security 
forces was proliferating.  Researchers were becoming aware that new weapons and techniques, 
previously used for dealing with insurgents and crowds in the former colonies, were being 
revamped for use in Europe, initially in Northern Ireland (Ackroyd et. al 1977) but eventually 
that these new technologies of political control would proliferate world-wide. (Wright, 1998; 
Omega Foundation, 2000). 
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Lessons from Urban Warfare in Northern Ireland 
 
Many modern paradigms of ‘peacekeeping’, forged during colonial times, have been more 
concerned with targeting potential insurgents than promoting social justice.  For example, when 
the British Army was sent in to give assistance to the Royal Ulster Constabulary in Northern 
Ireland in 1969, they arrived with a ready made set of ‘peacekeeping strategies’, which were 
formally set out in the British Army’s Land Operations Manual (British Army, 1969).  Almost 
the entire gamut of these phased strategies, built on escalating degrees of violence, has 
subsequently been deployed in the province.  The state response encompassed law enforcement 
activity, security operations, counter- insurgency, limited war tactics - all of which had 
components which could be evolved, re-engineered and adapted for new conflicts elsewhere. 
 
An essential consideration in assessing such programmed strategies is the extent to which this 
deployment becomes self- legitimating.  If the coercion used during the preliminary phases 
alienates sufficient numbers of citizenry to precipitate more resistance, this can produce ratchet 
effects which inevitably lead to the deployment of subsequent and ever more coercive phases.  In 
Northern Ireland that meant special courts, detention without trial, massive numbers of 
intimidatory house raids and new forms of riot control.  Paramilitaries have evolved their own 
forms of resistance including assassination programmes, car bombings and more open warfare.  
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A key issue, then, is the extent to which the state use of coercive weapons during peacekeeping 
operations can backfire.  One early study of the Northern Ireland troubles suggested that 
prolonged deployment of riot weapons exacerbated the conflict (Wright, 1978).  More recently, 
the Praxis Centre has presented a sophisticated study of the Northern Irish conflict using 
complex time series analysis (http://www.imresearch.org/PraxisCentre/NIrelandStudy). This 
study examined a range of state and paramilitary indicators to assess whether official ‘peace 
enforcement’ activities had induced so much alienation that resistance was deepened rather than 
quelled.  Whilst a detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this article, the conflict dynamics 
which emerged suggest the conflict is much more structured than previous studies have grasped 
and that violent peacekeeping, using less-lethal public order weapons such as plastic baton 
rounds, ‘locked’ the participants ‘in’ to violent conflict behaviours.  If the role of ‘peace 
induction’ activities is not recognised, this work suggests that the trend will be for more sub-
lethal weaponry to be used and that will make matters worse. 
 
The Evolution of ‘Torture -Lite’ 
 
If we accept De Swann’s thesis that as asymmetrical warfare advances, the intimidation services 
will seek to develop new and more specialized technical and administrative expertise too: it 
should not surprise us that any pacification programme built on masked violence will also 
develop new mechanisms for breaking its enemies – even if they are innocent. 
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In Belfast, all internees were subject to pre- interrogation treatments to maximise the stress of 
arrest. Several of these techniques are echoed in US treatment of Iraqi and Afghan detainees, 
including: general assault with kicks, knuckledusters and truncheons; men being forced to run 
barefoot over glass or dropped blindfolded from helicopters hovering near the ground; Alsatian 
dogs were used to savage prisoners; detainees were forced to stand for many hours in 
uncomfortable positions; they were deprived of sleep and repeatedly wakened; food and drink 
were withheld, bags were kept over the heads of some prisoners for up to six days; some 
prisoners were subject to sexual humiliation, detainees were urinated on whilst others were burnt 
with matches and candles; psychological tortures were used such as Russian roulette or mock 
executions. 
 
These measures were designed to mimic visual, tactile and kinaesthetic deprivation as well as 
disturb bodily functions. The work of Smith and Lensky (1959) showed that among the after 
effects of sensory deprivation, were loss of identity, feelings of unreality and disorientation. Fear 
and panic were common in anyone remaining in these conditions for more than just a few hours 
and some people experienced nightmares and acute paranoia (Zubek, 1969). 
 
The official Parker report on these techniques in Northern Ireland admitted that previous 
disparate techniques used by the British Army during earlier counterinsurgency campaigns in the 
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colonies had been unified and integrated (Parker et al,  1972).  Many techniques had played an 
important part in counter- insurgency operations in Palestine, Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, Brunei, 
British Guyana, Aden, Borneo and the Persian Gulf (ibid).  However, while based on previous 
campaigns, this torture trail has led from Belfast to Guantanamo Bay and then to Abu Ghraib in 
terms of techniques, a link now slowly being understood as former detainees are released and 
can tell their stories. 
 
A pattern is now emerging in the US ‘War Against Terror’ of a matrix of techniques deliberately 
being refined both at the software level (which includes standard operating procedures such as 
hoodings, humiliations, dressing in goggles and boiler suits, use of dogs, etc) and the liveware 
level where specific techniques are taught and replicated.  Recent evidence has indicated that 
prisoners were punished by an Extreme Reaction Force using a variety of procedures which 
included spraying prisoners with peppergas whilst restrained and then forced submersions in 
toilet bowls.  British Prisoners released from Guantanamo have reported that such episodes were 
routinely videoed for future training purposes (Panorama, 2004).  It is unlikely that such 
practices by the Coalition will remain in the Middle East.  Human Rights organisations are 
making the connections between the practices of US operatives in Cuba, Afghanistan and Iraq 
and linking these activities with the coercive interrogation training programmes taught at the US 
School of Americas and the US Army Centre at Ft Benning in Georgia (Amnesty International 
USA, 2004). 
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New Peacekeeping Weapons – Masking Repression 
 
So called ‘non-lethal weapons pre-date the US-led ‘War Against Terror’ and have featured 
regularly in human rights abuses since they first found a role in colonial times in crowd control 
operations (Omega Foundation, 2000).  From the 1960s to the 1990s, they were seen simply as a 
set of tactical tools to be used by both police and army in ‘low intensity conflict’ – essentially to 
augment rather than replace lethal force.  In the 1990s, science fiction writers and Quakers Janet 
and Chris Morris joined forces with futurologists Alvin and Heidi Toffler to advocate a new 
form of bloodless warfare (Toffler & Toffler, 1993).  The notion was ridiculed by many peace 
researchers as an oxymoron.  
 
The British Society for Social Responsibility in Science (BSSRS) was the first NGO to recognise 
that a new form of technology of political control was emerging, taylor-made for the different 
level force which was perceived as publicly acceptable in liberal democracies.  They predicted 
that the precise level of force and the nature of the technologies was a movable feast and would 
vary according to what was seen as politically expedient (BSSRS, 1974).  They noted that, as 
situations deteriorated, other flexible response weapons would be deployed that would notch up 
the acceptable threshold of permissible violence.  The more intimidating the technology, the 
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fewer state security personnel required to deploy it – the technology thus becomes a powerful 
force amplifier. 
 
Security peacekeeping packages often disguise agendas set by states, which demand pacification 
rather than justice.  The very technologies and tactics used for coercive peace-keeping operations 
are designed to mask the level of violence being used.  Tools to quash dissent are big business 
and the security apparatus is permeated by commercial interests aggressively marketing technical 
fixes for a wide range of social and political problems.  BSSRS (1974) was the first NGO to 
realise that such technologies were being designed to appear rather than be safe and to identify 
their function as an apparent technical ‘fix’ for wider social and political problems.  As such, 
names such as plastic bullets and teargas disguise the real effects of such weapons which include 
internal injuries, scalping, blindness, vomit induction and deaths (Omega, 2000 and NIHRC, 
2003). 
 
Today, it is evident that accelerating rates of technological development are increasingly driven 
by the commercial sector, not the military.  Increased weapons lethality and precision has also, 
as Estes (1997) predicted lead to ‘new operational doctrines’.  In particular, the US has begun to 
consolidate its Non-Lethal Weapons approach and the US Army is attempting to acquire a range 
of so called non- lethal 3  weapons for fielding peace keeping operations 
(http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/nld4/cosumano.pdf).  Such technologies, explored further below, have 
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a significant role in undermining future human rights.  With the US stance endorsed by NATO, 
the stage has now been set for institutionalising new technologies based on pain and maiming 
without creating the massive damage to physical infrastructure normally associated with 
conventional weapons4. 
 
Modern Border Control and Victim-Activated Punishment 
 
We should not presume that future peacekeeping algorithms will always be human based.  
Humans cost money, get tired, avail themselves of corruption and have discretion.  A modern 
techno-politics of exclusion may include machine operatives to patrol borders, deny areas and 
exclude all but permitted citizens and security personnel through a state’s security gateways.  In 
these instances the pain inducing technology is in the infrastructure of borders, perimeter fences 
and zone exclusion systems and is largely victim activated, 24/7 by self deciding automated 
sentinels. 
 
Some of this technology has and will emerge as a result of research into alternative landmines 
(Landmine Action, 2003), other technologies will arise out of the current non-lethal weapons 
research programmes.  The old style riot technology of plastic bullets, peppergas and water 
cannons is being augmented by what are seen as second generation or even third generation 
weapons.  These will include: taser-mine fields (victim activated munitions which project a 
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number of darts carrying 50,000 volts which can immobilize a target by interfering with skeletal 
muscle control to effect paralysis); directed energy weapons (which can use either high powered 
microwaves to heat up a human target or ionising lasers to allow air to carry a charge from long 
distances); pulsed energy projectiles (which use pulsed lasers to ionise the top layer of clothing 
or skin to produce a powerful shockwave); calmative encapsulation (which puts power 
tranquillizing agents or chemicals and toxins which affect heart rate body temperature or level of 
anxiety into thin membranes which burst when trodden on); robot self deciding vehicles (which 
can use semi- intelligence to hunt for humans in an exclusion zone and use weapons); projected 
electroshock and stun technology (some of which spray plasma that enables a large crowd to be 
targeted by lightening type shocks); vortex rings (which shoots large rings of energy which carry 
enough momentum to bowl over targets) and acoustic weapons (which vary from devices which 
make a deafening sound to machines which can speak to one human at a distance of over a 
kilometre by using the jaw bone as a speaker).  Many of these incapacitating and paralysing 
technologies are beyond the prototype stage and can facilitate the mass production of torture and 
other cruel, inhumane and degrading processes (Wright 2002). 
 
Systems, such as Raytheon’s $40m Vehicle Mounted Area denial System, are being readied for 
use in Iraq but have dubious safety assumptions: this system heats humans up to unbearable 
levels via microwave radiation.  The assumption is that they will be safe because people will self 
evacuate.  However, there is nothing in the weapons design which prevents it from heating 
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someone and their eyeballs beyond safe limits if they remain in contact.  A simple snag appears 
to have been overlooked – a natural response to unbearable eye pain is to shut the eyes so how 
will such targets safely exit the heat zone if they are effectively blinded?  Future research on the 
ethics of peacekeeping will have to explore the operational assumptions being built into the 
second and third generation sub-lethal weaponry – especially when future roles may include the 
creation of exclusion zones to prevent migration during times of rapid climate change or natural 
disaster (Martin & Wright, 2005). 
 
Challenging Violence as a Government Service 
 
Such ‘sub- lethal’ weaponry and technologies provide a convenient mechanism for states to 
legitimize or mask their institutionalised use of force (Rappert, 2003).  The ethical challenge for 
future researchers is how best to deconstruct these masks in ways which are meaningful to 
ordinary citizens, without themselves rising up the food chain of new security targets. 
 
In proposing ‘Countershock’ as a mechanism for mobilising resistance to electroshock weapons, 
Martin and Wright (2003) identify five ways in which government leaders and related apologists 
will seek to inhibit challenges to violence as a government service. These five methods are 
essentially: (i) hiding torture; (ii) devaluing the opponent; (iii) denying that any modern 
technologies have or will be used for repressive purposes; (iv) denying that any technology 
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under question actually causes damage; (v) claiming that all proper procedures were followed.  
To challenge violence as a government service, a new type of research activism is required – one 
that is connected to other protective, legal, political and media networks to ensure continued 
survival. 
 
Publicity is a very effective counter to hiding torture and organisations like Amnesty have done 
an excellent job in raising measures to both identify collusion and to stamp out torture (Amnesty 
International, 2000).  In the face of denials and devaluations, activists can challenge repressive 
technologies.  For example, in the UK we saw absolute denials given by companies such as 
British Aerospace that they had sold products which had been used in torture until the Channel 4 
programme The Torture Trail caught representatives of the company admitting as such to camera.  
Similarly, Taser claim their products are absolutely safe but Amnesty recently published a report 
attributing 70 deaths to taser usage in the USA and Canada (Amnesty, 2004).  Further, 
manufacturers and governments claim their plastic bullet rounds are safe but the Omega 
Foundation, in a report to the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission (NIHRC, 2003), 
showed that the bullet’s kinetic energy was in the severe damage region and that officers were 
firing them outside the range of the official guidelines and continued to act with impunity. 
 
Governments always claim to follow procedures unless challenged with solid evidence to the 
contrary.  This is an area where research activism can come into its own.  By providing carefully 
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researched examples, other more hidden faces behind the pacification pipleline can be unmasked.  
Through field research and detailed examples, NGO’s such as the Omega Foundation, IANSA, 
Oxfam and Amnesty International have been able to deconstruct the loopholes which allow 
business as usual (Oxfam et al, 2004).  In the longer term, such international co-operation 
between research activists may offer the best means of proliferating counter measures against the 
spread of illegal violence-based, second generation pacification technologies and techniques. 
 
                                                 
1 Praxis Centre, Leeds Metropolitan University, UK. 
2 Enloe (1980) further developed this theory in identifying the role of dominant ethnic groups monopolizing certain 
key peacekeeping and internal security roles and function. 
3 Even the name itself is a misnomer. Some now deem them less-lethal since they can and do kill or maim on 
occasion, or pre-lethal since in some operations sub-lethal weapons such as chemical irritants are used to flush out 
demonstrators into the direct line of more lethal fire. 
4 At least, that is the theory, though there is not much evidence of that in Iraq. Ironically the failure there will fuel 
the notion that state removal can be done much more humanely with this new hardware in the string of conflicts to 
come. 
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Abstract: Violent ‘peace keeping’ is a contradiction in terms but not if we analyse the provision 
of coercive law enforcement as just another organising process in state bureaucracies. This paper 
argues that events surrounding 9/11 merely accelerated processes of coercive peace keeping, 
which were already re-orientating following the cold war.  The technologies used for coercive 
peacekeeping operations are designed to mask the level of violence being used.  These include 
new methods of tracking and punishing dissent as well as prison techniques and technologies for 
disabling resis tance.  Such tools to quash dissent are big business and the security apparatus is 
permeated by commercial interests aggressively marketing technical fixes. Future researchers 
and NGOs will need to deconstruct these masks, without themselves rising up the food chain of 
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new security targets. We may be seeing the genesis of a new type of research activism designed 
to promote human security as if people mattered. 
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